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Abstract 
 
The research developed in this study will utilize Social Network and Graph Theory 
terminology and methodology applied to groups of systems, rather than individuals 
within a given system, in order to shape strategic level goals.  With regard to military 
operations, Social Network Analysis has been used to show that enemy networks and 
relationships can be accurately represented using weighted layers with weighted 
relationships in order to identify the key player(s) that must be influenced and/or 
removed so that a particular effect on the enemy might be realized.  Social Network 
Analysis is therefore a significant tool concerning tactical level of operations that aids in 
developing a targeting methodology which aids tactical commanders in mission planning, 
however has never been applied to strategic levels of Command.  Like previous key 
player problems, this research will utilize system attributes and global relational strengths 
as inputs.  The output results will rank order representative systems of interest that satisfy 
the constraints and desired objectives within a particular Phase of War.  This work will 
apply and extend the tools of Social Network Analysis structure and techniques to a 
theater level mission. 
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APPLYING SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS TO MILITARY STRATEGY, 
SYSTEM NETWORKS AND THE PHASES OF WAR 
 
I.  Introduction 
“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is 
indispensable.” 
- Dwight D. Eisenhower 
1.1 Background 
 Social Network Analysis (SNA) in military operations has met with mixed 
results over the last two American wars: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM/NEW 
DAWN (OIF/OND) and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).  In OIF, 
SNA was utilized successfully to capture Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein [1].  
The United States Army’s initial capture efforts against Saddam Hussein focused on 
the command-based hierarchical network rather than the familial-based network that 
eventually led to his capture.  The change between network styles was inspired by the 
US Military’s application of hard power and resultant attrition of the hierarchical 
network.  Additionally, the discovery of linkages previously unknown to the analysts 
indicated the present of a previously unidentified familial and tribal based network.  In 
Afghanistan, SNA was less successful in producing inroads to the capture of Osama 
Bin Laden [2].  In both the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, these individual targets 
were detected and their locations deduced at the operational and tactical levels.  This 
then offers the question: how would these operations have been defended in the larger 
strategic context?  Or to put it another way, was the hunt for Saddam Hussein 
justifiable in the strategic perspective of prosecuting OIF?  This paper will introduce a 
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generalized methodology for approaching strategic level entities that are composed of 
large numbers of supporting systems.  This methodology is scalable, but focused here 
on desired strategic objectives for various effects. 
Militaries, businesses and governments of the future will confront an 
increasingly complex and multi-dimensional operating environment.  From a military 
point of view, a brief study of modern history and warfare suggests that most major 
conflicts were either preceded (US Revolution, Algerian revolt (1954), Chinese Civil 
war (1946)) or followed (Philippine Insurrection (1902), OIF, Vietnam (circa 1972)) 
by so-called low intensity or insurgent styles of conflict. History also concludes that in 
low intensity conflicts, large armies and World Powers tend to perform very poorly 
[3].  Modern examples of this include the French in Indochina and Algeria, Russia’s 
incursions in Afghanistan and Chechnya, and the United States in Somalia and 
Vietnam.  These low intensity conflicts are often characterized by costly and 
destabilizing operations conducted by a group of people whose numbers are small 
relative to the population within which they operate.  In order to defeat or marginalize 
these insurgent elements, the support of both the population and the indigenous 
government is required.  This motivates an analysis of how war is fought on the 
strategic level, addressing if strategic targeting can undercut an existing low intensity 
conflict or lower the chances of a low intensity conflict occurring following the 
decisive clash of rival militaries.  Unfortunately for the US Department of Defense, 
most strategic objectives rely on elements of national power outside the purview of the 
military; this necessitates a so-called Whole of Government (WoG) approach to 
strategic targeting. 
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1.2 Motivation 
 The aim of this research is to provide a robust and agile framework to inform 
the Whole of Government strategic targeting process by utilizing quantitative social 
network and operations research techniques.  Furthermore, this paper will illustrate the 
quantitative impact of the DoD’s ‘Phase of War’ concept [4] [5] [6] on the production 
and valuing of strategic target sets.  
 In the specific case study of the 2003 Iraq War, post invasion planning was 
sparse and woefully inadequate [7].  During the build up to the invasion of Iraq, it was 
common for planners to divide large campaigns into four phases: Deter/Engage, Seize 
Initiative, Decisive Operations, and Transition.  As a military, planning the 
degradation and destruction of a foreign power, country, or target (in current US 
doctrine, Phase Three – Decisive Operations) is relatively routine.  However, during 
OIF it did not appear that US targeting accounted for restoring utilities, services, basic 
functionality, or an operational government.  In fact, according to Wright and Reese, 
“… [planners] allowed Phase Four plans to develop in isolation, thus hindering the 
establishment of critical linkages and smooth transitions between combat and post 
combat operations.” [7]  Though the US OIF strategy was far from a ‘total war’ 
concept, the US attacked military systems as well as any military/civilian dual use 
systems that might have been used by the adversary.  In so doing, the US 
accomplished the capitulation of Baghdad quickly with extremely low casualties; 
however, US actions also lengthened the time required to restore basic necessities to 
the population of Iraq. The result was an increase in the strength and intensity of the 
anti-American sentiment in post-Saddam Iraq, ultimately fomenting the insurgency.  
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The policy of de-Ba’athification of the Iraqi armed forces and political processes 
supplied the raw number of trained leaderless personnel and unemployed young men 
for the nascent insurgency in 2003.  Then, the inability to restore basic economic 
conditions and functioning government prolonged the reintegration process and thus 
allowed this at-risk portion of Iraqi society to spiral into open rebellion.   
 An underlying goal of efficient strategic targeting is to minimize the 
reconstruction phase of a complex societal network in order to shorten the window for 
a prolonged low intensity conflict.  In essence, that means the exercise of all forms of 
national power including Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic (DIME) 
throughout every Phase of War during an event like the OIF.  The only elements of 
such a campaign that change are the proportions of actions by phase that fall within 
the various DIME spheres and which agencies generate those actions.  This also 
implies that manipulation or influencing human-based and non-human nodes within a 
given network is just as important as the efforts of hard power (used here to refer to 
removing human and non-human nodes within a given network).  Therefore, 
augmenting current targeting practices with network-centric analysis in order to 
achieve a given effect with fewer rounds, bombs, or ground forces may, in and of 
itself, greatly improve the current joint targeting process.   
 Almost all systems contain human elements including governments, militaries, 
and societies.  This implies targeting processes must consider human networks’ 
different properties: they are adaptive, self-repairing at a faster rate than infrastructure, 
able to grow and cluster when threatened, and will display increasingly binary 
decision making (for us/against us) when under threat that limits options for influence.  
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Therefore, we may be able to shape the possible end state density of “against us” 
networks by seeding human networks with positive influence factors far in advance of 
applications of hard power.  Further, by using means of influence that might be 
traceable and measureable such as attendance at non-governmental organization 
(NGO)/healthcare events, opinion polls, or attendance at adversarial indoctrination 
systems, we can also conduct initial reconnaissance efforts to expose members of so-
called Dark Networks.  The term ‘Dark Network’ in social network literature refers to 
“Interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit 
activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft 
techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve 
their purpose [8].”  These human networks would be an aggregation of weighted and 
layered political, religious, tribal, familial, and other associations that would vary by 
culture/location/history of the people under consideration.   
 The construction of these networks, from weighted/layered human based 
networks to binary/undirected infrastructure/system based networks, would require 
classified sources and many subject matter experts to synthesize and construct.  
Furthermore, these networks would be dynamic: computers servers come up and down 
for repair, businesses grow and change, political movements gain/lose prominence, 
border crossings and points of entry atrophy, and laws change.  Therefore, updating 
these networks (the human based networks especially) prior to any major engagement 
is a necessity whether it is trade negotiation, invasion, Information Operations (IO) 
Campaign (anti/pro), and normalize/sever political relations.  Furthermore, these 
networks should be saved and time stamped into order to gain insight how they change 
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over time and why.  By tracking these changes and overlaying them with other 
intelligence sources, analysts and SMEs may gain insight into how perturbations of the 
network reverberate throughout said network as well as responses of the network to 
different manners of stimuli (influence/attrition and actions after splintering the 
network).  These are among the reasons why this research avoids the creation of these 
networks; the process would be a distraction from the utility of the new method of 
application of SNA.  The discussion of follow on actions is contained in Chapter Five. 
 Insofar the desire to minimize or truncate the time prosecuting low intensity 
conflicts, a methodology is needed for conducting analysis against targeted 
institutions, organizations and countries that more efficiently supports a post conflict 
political environment.  In short, this desired tool could be used at the tactical level to 
collapse and destroy insurgent groups or fielded militaries that can also expand to the 
address the transnational and strategic level of WoG policies and approaches.  Select 
applications of Social Network Analysis (SNA) provide military planners with a 
scalable, quantitative tool and an iterative process to address strategic level problems 
and conduct national level analysis.  Social Network Analysis should be used in 
conjunction with, but not replace, current planning methods to increase operational 
effectiveness.   
1.3 Problem Statement 
 This research will provide a framework for applying SNA to large strategic 
level systems of systems by considering descriptive Political, Military, Economic, 
Social, Infrastructure and Information (PMESII) networks within the DIME spheres of 
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influence and objective-dependant centrality measures in order to create Phase of War 
dependant target lists.  The transition between DIME and PMESII here is significant.  
Elements of DIME are usually referred to as ‘Instruments of National Power’ and as 
such, roughly correlate to foreign operations conducted by the State Department, 
Intelligence Community, Department of Defense and Department of Treasury (or 
under the international trade and treaty powers of Congress) respectively.  By 
translating DIME instruments onto PMESII networks, rather than PMESII effects, this 
traditional paradigm of influence spheres is fundamentally altered.  The resulting 
targeting product can be assigned to a department or agency by capability against a 
target system as opposed to traditional sphere of influence. 
 This paper exposes strategic problems to the methods and treatments of SNA 
to gain insight into more efficient targeting and exploitation of large scale multi-
source networks.  In so doing, two network types will be proposed: the Dependency 
Networks and the Will Networks composed of binary relational infrastructure and 
weighted human structures respectively.  Specifically, it will be demonstrated that 
target sets are dependent upon Decision Maker objectives as described through 
centrality measures.  Further, human based and binary network interplay is used to 
illustrate Whole of Government utility in war or conflict scenarios.  Finally, it is 
proposed that, when taken together, human influence operations and binary systems 
interdiction could decrease the effort required to achieve effects and decrease the time 
required to rebuild networks, thereby limiting the intensity and duration of so-called 
low intensity conflicts. 
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1.4 General Assumptions and Limitations 
 In treating our networks, perfect knowledge is initially assumed for a given 
network.  However, this paper will provide tools and insights to relax this assumption 
and utilize this methodology on networks with imperfect knowledge.  Additionally, 
the PMESII networks will be independent for illustrative purposes.  Independence, 
however, is not a limitation on this method; when treating multiple networks as 
layered social networks, methods and tools already exist to deal with these 
interdependencies.  This research is intended for a military audience; nonetheless, the 
theory and applications are as generalized as possible so as to maintain applicability to 
any other sufficiently large entity. 
 SNA is a relatively new field within Operations Research and as such its 
strategic applications are limited.  SNA has been applied to large networks before, but 
these networks are typically characterized by one element (e.g. the network analysis 
on Twitter trends in reference to a specific event in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).  
There is little in the current literature where SNA has ever been applied to a complex 
entity like a country or system of systems (with multiple ‘styles’ of systems 
represented).  This thesis will be limited to static, notional networks to avoid obvious 
classification issues.   
 This research addresses strategic level, Whole of Government network analysis 
problems and exploits the properties of similar layered networks to gain insight into 
objective oriented targeting.  This does not mean the methods or insights gained from 
this thesis will apply strictly to military personnel or a unique subset of military 
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problems.  In fact, with inconsequential changes in labels, this method could easily 
apply to any complex corporate or inter-organization analysis.   
1.5 Scope 
 This paper discusses strategic level objectives and develops a method for 
identifying institutions or organizations in order to achieve a strategic effect.  Analysis 
is limited to a sufficiently large or complex entity such as a country or large 
corporation.  This method could be theoretically applied to a regional set of countries 
or an interrelation of many international corporations who operate across economic 
sectors; however, under that application, this process would be iterative and 
presumably multi-echeloned in nature.  While the method proposed in this research is 
therefore scalable, it is also intended for multi-institutional level analysis.  Once the 
subject of interest evolves from key organizations and institutions, then the applicable 
analytical methods return to the classic interpretations of the Key Player problem [9] 
[10] [11] [12] [13] within a targeted system or a Value Focused Thinking (VFT) 
problem concerning which subset of targets is more attractive and why.  These 
discussions will mark the strategic/operational divide for this research, and therefore 
avoid analysis on networks of individuals in order to maintain the strategic level of 
aggregation.  
1.6 Thesis Overview 
 Chapter Two (Literature Review) establishes a baseline to explore the expansion 
of theory and broader applications.  Here, the focus is on common terminology, existing 
methods and current measures of the SNA community upon which this proposed 
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approach rests.  Within the same literature review, joint military terminology and doctrine 
is introduced only to the extent required to illustrate the power of our method under 
consideration.  Chapter Three discusses the methodology of objective based network 
centrality measures and Phase of War weighting that might yield strategic insight.  
Chapter Four includes analysis and conclusions from a notional strategic level network as 
well as robustness discussions related to the relative scales of realistic networks.  Lastly, 
in Chapter Five, will examine the implications of this research and follow on topics for 
investigation based on the conclusions. 
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II. Literature Review 
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” 
- George Santayana 
2.1 Introduction 
 In this section, the main purpose is to review the underpinnings of strategic 
targeting and Social Network Analysis as they pertain to this research. This chapter 
has several objectives.  First, an overview of Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
terminology and associated research is provided.  Secondly, graph theory is introduced 
and current centrality applications are reviewed.  Finally, basic military strategy 
foundations and targeting doctrine are organized and highlighted which this study 
strives to improve so that associated military decision makers can improve their 
insight into the strategic decision space.   
2.2 Social Network Analysis and Graph Theory 
 Social Network Analysis (SNA) refers to the art and science of representing a 
group of individuals or groups in terms of network theory wherein each object (group 
or individual) is represented as a node and the relationships such as friendship, 
kinship, and other associations between these objects are represented with a line [14].  
These diagrams are often called network diagrams or ‘sociograms’ [15].  It is 
important to note that while the network diagram and associated constructs and 
attributes are important, the manner in which networks are built and understood can 
often fundamentally change the results of our calculations or alter our insights into the 
network.  This attribute might be viewed as a methodological weakness by some 
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analysts who might prefer an objective, unitless network depiction bereft of bias from 
the analyst.  To the contrary, however, this method allows for the distillation of 
important groups and individuals and over arching connection traits which allows for 
the various cultures and groups to be modeled.  Indeed, when attempting to calculate 
methods of influence upon a human based network, there is not a single weighting 
scheme to describe motivations as these weights are culturally, ethnically and 
geographically dependant.   
 
2.3.1 Social Networks and Applications 
 With its roots in sociology and anthropology, SNA has become more 
mathematically formalized within the last few decades.  Originally, SNA studied the 
interactions between individuals within a group residing in the behavioral sciences 
disciplines during the 1930’s [16].  Three of the arguably most influential figures in 
the foundation of SNA were Drs. Lewin, Moreno, and Heider [16].  Moreno’s seminal 
1953 work is most commonly associated with early attempts to quantitatively link 
SNA with graph theory as it was understood in his time [15].  In fact, many early 
techniques concerning insights from Sociograms were developed based on Moreno.  
In recent years, much work has focused on the multi-faceted nature of relationships 
between individuals within a group.  Within each group, members may be linked with 
relational ties of varying strength including familial, religious, economic, kinship, 
tribal and other associations [9] [10] [13]. 
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2.3.2 Graph Theory 
 SNA is mathematically rooted in the discipline of Graph Theory, though there 
are a few meaningful differences in definitions and assumptions.  The theoretical 
underpinnings of Graph Theory are widely accepted to be Leonhard Euler’s solution 
to the ‘Seven Bridges of Konigsberg’ problem published in 1736.  Euler’s work was 
codified into a mathematically rigid theory of infinite and finite graphs by D. Konig in 
1936 [17]; both Euler’s and Konig’s works provide the mathematical foundation of all 
graph theory and therefore SNA discussions.  Generally, a graph is a depiction of a 
pair-wise mathematical relationship between two objects.   These objects are usually 
referred to as “vertices” or “nodes” or “actors” and can represent anything from 
countries to atoms.  The lines connecting these objects are called “arcs” or “edges” 
and represent the strength, characterization or existence of their interaction.  Taken 
together, graphs might depict anything from an individual player within a network and 
its associated relational ties to atoms in a molecule and their associated bonds that 
keep the molecule together [18].      
 Mathematically, a graph, G, is described as G = (V,E) where V is the set 
containing n nodes, V = {p1,p2…pn}, and the set E containing m edges between those 
nodes.  In the context of graph theory and current literature, an edge traveling from 
node a to node b is denoted as (a,b).  This indicates a link or relationship between 
nodes a and b; it is then said that a is adjacent to b.  We then let a matrix, A = (aij) be 
the adjacency matrix of graph G.  Here, we must also characterize the type of 
relationships as found in Figure 1: 
14 
 
Figure 1: Nodal Relationships 
 If edge (a,b) does not exist, it is said that nodes a and b are unconnected.  (a,b) 
is “undirected” if the link is equal in both directions, i.e. a influences b just as much as 
b influences a.  If the relationship is unbalanced or one-way (e.g. a passive listener to a 
radio/television station) then we say that the relationship is “directed” and then we 
represent the link (a,b) as an arrow from a to b.  Thus in an undirected network, the 
values of aij = aji and are either 1 or 0, indicating the existence (1) or non-existence (0) 
of an undirected and reciprocal relationship.  Directed networks are ideal for 
describing asymmetric networks, where aij ≠aji.  This produces an asymmetric 
adjacency matrix A and therefore, changes the interpretation of certain measures.  
Also we would say such a relationship is asymmetric if the edge (a,b) and the edge 
(b,a) are not reciprocal.  This can happen in the case where a influences b, but b 
influences a more.  As Brewer and Webster pointed out, directed and asymmetric 
edges are more appropriate in sociological environments as human interactions are 
rarely, if ever reciprocal. [19]   
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2.4 Network Centrality and the Key Player 
 Solving problems using applications of SNA inevitably involve the use of so 
called Centrality Measures.  Early in the history of SNA centrality was a term used to 
describe leadership roles [20] [21] [22].  As SNA initially grew from the social and 
behavioral sciences, this could be expected.  The initial goal was, among other things, 
to identify the individual within a group that maintained the most power within the 
group [23].  This interpretation of centrality quickly evolved into a multitude of 
measures to describe various roles and different interpretations of importance [24] 
[25].  Therefore, Centrality Measures within the context of SNA, are calculations of 
importance based on the characteristics in which an analyst or DM is interested.  As 
such, SNA practitioners now have plethora of ways to answer the question “who is the 
most important person in this network?”, or to speak more generally for any given 
graph G, “Which node is the most important?”  Any practitioner of SNA should 
immediately reply with the question “what is the objective with regard to this 
network?” or “what is the definition of important here?”   
 Consider two separate scenarios: Geffre’s analysis concerning the degradation 
of a dark terrorist network [9] and Bernardoni’s use of Social Network ‘holes’ to 
inform reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan following the U.S. lead NATO invasion 
[26].  In both cases, the networks were created in a similar fashion, and yet they used 
different centrality measures to express different effects.  Geffre primarily used 
Eigenvector Centrality which provided a mathematical preference to a node if that 
node is connected to other nodes with many other nodes (values nodes’ importance if 
it is connected to other important nodes).  This produced a ranked list of potential 
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targets that might disrupt or degrade the terrorist network’s actions or capabilities.   
Bernardoni’s used the occupation of structural holes [27] to suggest the creation of 
reconciliation ties between disparate ethnicities and focus resources to thereby create a 
more inclusive society and more stable state.  Central to the idea of structural holes is 
Betweenness Centrality, wherein a node’s rank is determined by the number of 
geodesic paths on which said node exists between all pairs of nodes within the 
network [28].  These two examples illustrate that, not only does the manner in which 
networks are built matter, but similarly, our choice of centrality measure grants us 
different insight based on our final objective.   
 In fact, while the field of SNA has witnessed an explosion of specialized 
centrality measures within the last twenty years, many of these measures are highly 
correlated [29] and therefore provide little new information for a given network.  
However, there are four measures which have withstood academic scrutiny so as to be 
considered foundational to the field of SNA: Degree, Eigenvector, Betweenness and 
Closeness Centrality [30].  From this list of four, there are two that have not been 
previously discussed here: degree and closeness centrality.   
 Degree centrality is simply a measure of the number of nodes to which a 
particular node is attached.  Great care must be taken when concluding any insight 
based solely on degree centrality as special attention must be afforded to the type of 
relational ties the edges represent.  An example of an individual with high degree 
centrality might be a food delivery person or a manger in a highly micro-managed 
work environment.  Firing the food delivery person (removing that node from the 
network) may not have the same impact or degradation on the network as removing 
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the micro-managing boss.  The last measure is closeness, which refers to the mean 
distance from a node of interest to all other nodes in the network [31].  Here the higher 
the rank of the metric, the lower the node’s average distance is from every other node 
in the network. 
2.4.1 Calculating Centrality 
 Direct calculations for these four primary Centrality Measures can be performed 
by hand for small networks in a relatively straight forward fashion, however, most 
naturally occurring networks are quite large.  Therefore, practitioners must use 
algorithms to efficiently calculate these and other measures.  Consider the following 
simple undirected unweighted network: 
 
Figure 2: Sample Network 
 With its associated Adjacency Matrix, A: 
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Table 1: Sample Network Adjacency Matrix 
 
 Degree Centrality, CD, is simply the number of adjacent (connected) nodes to a 
source node and can be calculated via a summation [25]: 
 
1
D ij
n
j
C A
=
=∑  (1) 
 Closeness Centrality CC, for any node, ni, is a measure derived from the inverse 
sum of the distance from that node to all other nodes in the network.  ‘Closeness’ 
centrality aims to determine how ‘geographically central’ a node is relative to the rest of 
the network.  In Equation 2, the term d(ni,nj) is the distance between node i to node j [25]: 
 
1
1
( ) ( , )]c i i jg
j
C n d n n
−
=
 =  ∑ , where g ∈ {1…n} (2) 
 Betweenness Centrality, CB, is related to Closenness Centrality in that paths are 
considered, however, Betweenness Centrality measures the number of times a node of 
interest, ni, lies on the a shortest path, gjk, between any two members of the network.  The 
betweenness can be thought of as a ‘go-between’ measure that depicts the extent to which 
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members of the network are dependent upon the target node to keep the network 
connected.  Betweenness Centrality can be calculated directly [25]:  
 
( )( ) jk iB i
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g nC n
g<
=∑  (3) 
 Finally, Eigenvector Centrality [25], related to Gould Index [32] values, is a 
representation of importance based on the relative importance of a node’s connections.  
In other words, Eigenvector Centrality prefers nodes that are adjacent to other highly 
connected nodes.  From linear algebra, we can calculate an eigenvector, λ, of a matrix by 
recalling: 
 ( ) 0A I Cλ− =  (4) 
 λ is an eigenvector of matrix A if and only if there exists a non-zero vector C such 
that Equation 4 is true.  Matrix I is the identity matrix.  If A is an n x n square adjacency 
matrix, then solving for λ in Equation 5 below will yield a set of eigenvectors (solving eq. 
1.5 below) and an n x 1 matrix associated with each eigenvector λ. 
 det( ) 0A Iλ− =  (5) 
 Defining the principal eigenvector as λo = max |λ|, our eigenvector associated with 
λo is the result of substituting λo = λ and solving Equation 4 for C.  This will produce an n 
x 1 matrix, Co, where the value of Ci is the associated eigenvector centrality for node ni.   
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Table 2: Sample Network Measures 
 
 
 Table 2 shows the calculations for all above described Centrality Measures for the 
sample network found in Figure 2.  Even in this extremely small network, it can be seen 
that each centrality measure produces a uniquely valued list from one to n.  Notice node 
5, in this example has the highest degree centrality, but not the highest closeness or 
eigenvector centrality.  Therefore, determining which nodes are ‘central’ or ‘most 
important’ to any network given a network is unanswerable unless we discuss which 
properties make a node important within the current decision space. 
2.5 Dark Networks and Centrality Robustness 
 Much of the discussion of networks and the ensuing traditional analysis rests 
on the assumption that near perfect knowledge is known concerning the true structure 
of the network, these are co-called ‘bright networks.’  However, as is more often the 
case, an analyst may not have perfect information or the network under analysis 
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purposefully behaves in a way that eludes detection.  Networks known as Dark or 
Clandestine Networks are ingrained with “secrecy as a part of its existence” [33] and 
must limit recruitment within pre-existing networks of relationships [34].  According 
to McCormick and Owen, a clandestine network is characterized by three factors: size, 
location, and structure [35].  For these networks to maintain freedom to operate, they 
must evade detection or significant attrition.  Therefore they must balance the size of 
the organization and its capacity to operate; the greater the group’s size, the easier said 
group would be detected.  Also, in order to maximize operational impact, small cells 
would have to be located close to an adversary’s interests.  Likewise, such a group’s 
structure must be necessarily compartmentalized due to operational security concerns.  
Very few (if any) highly protected individuals would have complete knowledge of the 
network and its various efforts and operations; furthermore, communication between 
these individuals and the organization would be highly covert and extremely difficult 
to penetrate [35].   
2.5.1 Centrality Robustness 
 The most often cited weakness of SNA is most often the assumption of perfect 
information.  Whether a network is inherently dark as in the case of terror organizations, 
organized crime, or coincidentally dark as in the case of missing information about an 
accessible network, the problem from the practitioner’s point of view is the same: 
inaccurate knowledge of the network.  Fortunately, Borgatti, Carly and Krackhardt 
looked at this very question.  Their study reviewed the sensitivity of four measures 
(degree, eigenvector, closeness and between) against four types of data error: Node 
addition, node subtraction, edge addition and edge subtraction.  They concluded three 
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very important points concerning the four fundamental Centrality Measures that will 
support the viability of this research [30].  First, in terms of robustness, all four measures 
are comparably robust with betweenness centrality being slightly less sensitive to errors 
in the data.  Secondly, all types of errors had similar effect on accuracy.  Generally 
speaking, all four centrality measures are still robust enough to be useful with an error 
rate under approx 10%.  The study does caveat this last conclusion by pointing out that 
misidentifying a key node in an infectious disease scenario could be disastrous [30].  
However, by remaining at the strategic level and creating phase dependent methods, this 
study hopes to minimize the impact of imperfect information.  By remaining at the 
strategic level, the structure and composition of individual systems is largely aggregated 
into a single node.  Then too, the connections between two strategic systems also 
represent an aggregated connection.  This is much like detecting a celestial object in deep 
space by way of gravitational effects; the physicist need not know the topography or 
composition of a planetary body to know that such an object exists.  Therefore, even 
intergovernmental clandestine impacts or effects can be estimated so long as the overall 
relationship is correct and the target system can be ascertained.  The detection of the 
specific clandestine sub-network, office or group lies in the operational domain of system 
specific exploitation.  Thus, it is highly unlikely and therefore assumed that strategic 
nodes and relational edges between those nodes would be undetectable at a greater rate 
than the 10% found to be significant by Borgatti, Carly and Krackhardt. 
2.5.2 Treatment of Dark Networks 
 In the context of this discussion, imperfect or dark networks will be aggregated 
to the institutional level as discretely as possible.  For example, in the case of one 
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business trying to compete favorably against another business, perhaps the adversary 
business has only a handful of distribution points in a given region.  Rather than 
describe this adversary’s distribution operation to a high resolution network at an 
individual level, we could describe the system in terms of sub-contractor companies or 
support systems present.  This approach would initially allow us to determine 
importance through an applicable centrality measure based on our objective 
(distribution centers implies a flow of goods, perhaps betweenness and closeness 
would be appropriate) and conserve intelligence gathering resources until a subset of 
organizations is identified and greater knowledge is required before influence or action 
can be applied.  This approach will minimize the impact of misidentifying a key 
individual at the onset as a result of imperfect information while simultaneously 
conserving finite intelligence gathering resources. 
2.6 Weighting Techniques  
 The elicitation of weights from a decision maker is one of the most important 
tasks an analyst can perform with regard to most decision analysis methods.  Because 
these weights mathematically represent the DM’s interest, focus, and establish his or her 
priorities, correctly eliciting values and weights from a DM is essential.  There are 
several methods by which an analyst might capture these values.  Most methods for 
eliciting values for weighting purposes were established by Multiattribute Utility Theory, 
where the utility of an alternate exists within [0, 1].  As such, these methods must adhere 
to decision theory axioms and are predicated on the belief that there exists a worse case 
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alternative that achieves zero utility and a theoretical best case alternative that scores a 
perfect one [36]. 
 By way of example, this research considers two types of elicitation methods.  The 
first is direct elicitation and the second is swing weight elicitation.  Direct elicitation is 
simply an ordinal rank based method but perhaps the most damaging if performed 
incorrectly.  In direct elicitation, one simply asks the decision maker how he/she ranks 
each element relative to the others.  In large models, this is prohibitively taxing and 
unfeasibly complex to accomplish in a realistic amount of time.  This approach also 
carries with it a multitude of inherent biases that an unprepared DM might introduce into 
the model [36].  As an example, two methods of direct elicitation weighting are Rank 
Sum and Rank Reciprocal.  In both Equations 6 and 7, ri is the ordinal rank associated 
with the ith element.  In the Rank Sum method, the weight of the ith element, wti, in a set 
of K elements is calculated according to Equation 6.  Furthermore, the Rank Sum method 
will produce a set of weights with a linear relative relationship between every element; 
this is both easily calculable but may result in an over simplification of a particular DM’s 
beliefs. 
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 Another method for inferring weights from a DM’s ordinal ranks is to use the 
Rank Reciprocal method.  Calculating weights using this method is also straight forward 
as seen in Equation 7 below. 
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 The Rank Reciprocal method produces a set of weights that will heavily favor the 
first and second-ranked elements like those of a negative exponential curve.  This method 
will break ties achieved through otherwise equal tradeoffs that would result from the use 
of the linear Rank Sum methodology.   
 In swing weighting, an analyst can infer weights based on the DM’s comparative 
descriptions of attribute level combinations.  A simple approach is asking a DM to 
allocate 100 points representing their belief of importance among various attributes.  A 
potentially less biased approach to swing weighting is an extensive pair wise comparison 
matrix between all attributes under consideration [36].  The choice of weight elicitation 
method will vary according to the DM for which the study is conducted.  The weights 
shown in Table 3 are provided as an example of a final product resulting from such an 
elicitation. 
2.7 The Foundation of Modern Military Joint Operations 
 Military communities have their own terminology and lexicon, as well as 
methods for discussing campaign planning and methods of warfare.  The nature of 
warfare has evolved dramatically since the early 1990’s [6], marked mainly by the 
development of precision technologies including unmanned vehicles, the speed of 
communications and the interdependencies between the service branches under the 
tenants of joint [5] and combined war [4].  The Department of Defense (DoD) has 
attempted a unification process over the previous decades to create a standard joint 
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language and the processes by which the department’s personnel create plans.  These 
are codified in Joint Publications (JPs) and form the common operating starting point 
at which all joint planning begins.   
 Since passage of the Goldwaters-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 and following the First Gulf War (1990-1991), military strategists grappled 
with the idea of both US Army-centric targeting as well as the formal concept of ‘Joint 
Targeting.’  As Bartell illustrates, “In the joint environment, the problem [of targeting] is 
more profound; there is insufficient doctrine to assist the…Commander in synchronizing 
the fight and maximizing combat power.” [37] In the time since Bartell wrote his 
criticism of the state of US joint doctrine in 1997, the DoD has attempted significant 
progress in terms of Joint High Intensity Warfare; however synchronization of targeting 
inside the DoD and across US DIME capabilities remains problematic.   
 The invasion of Panama, OPERATION JUST CAUSE, in 1989 represented a 
substantial step toward true unified joint command as well as provided a proof of concept 
of the new Goldwater-Nichols Act organization.  The two operations that succeeded it 
built upon early joint success and became the model of joint lethality: OPERATION 
DESERT SHIELD and OPERATION DESERT STORM in 1990 and 1991 respectively.  
These three operations serve as the bedrock upon which our current joint doctrine stands.  
As a result of this doctrinal shift, the US-led coalition invasion of Iraq toppled the 
Saddam Hussein Ba’ath Government in less than three months (20 March to 1 May 2003) 
while incurring less than 200 US combat deaths [38].  Much of this improvement came 
about through early applications of so-called ‘effects-based’ planning [39] which focused 
joint commanders on conditions and points of influence on the ground, rather than 
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individual service component missions.  These joint effects can be realized through any 
conceivable application of military power; they can be destructive or constructive, 
offensive or defensive, lethal or non-lethal in nature. 
2.8 Military Targeting and Strategy 
 Military targeting and strategy differs from civilian organizational or 
corporation strategy, however the process of strategy creation is the same for any 
business as it is for the military: establish a vision for the future, gather information on 
a rival, set leadership-driven objectives, perform analysis against adversary 
weaknesses while mitigating your own, create a plan to exploit the rival’s perceived 
weakness using your perceived strength, execute the plan, assess and revise the plan as 
required.  In this section, military targeting and strategy formulation is discussed as a 
proxy for general targeting and strategy development.  Although the following section 
is written to appeal to members of the profession of arms, it holds general applicability 
to anyone in executive level leadership or analysis roles.  
2.8.1 Targeting 
 JP 3-60 defines targeting as, “…the process of selecting and prioritizing targets 
and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements 
and capabilities.”  In true military fashion, this is written succinctly while remaining 
unconstrained in order to allow for an individual commander’s interpretation.  The 
targeting process that is enshrined within JP 3-60 requires the commander’s input for 
preference of the appropriate response (engagement method) and operational 
requirements.  In practice, the majority of target planning in the US Army is executed 
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by military intelligence and certain combat trained Officers and non-commissioned 
Officers.  An operational planner or strategist may join the group at a strategic level or 
if a given operation is to take place in the far future.  The reasoning behind this 
practice is traditional and pragmatic; combat specialized personnel are trained to look 
at physical targets across a battle space and intelligence personnel are present to 
provide possible enemy reactions or impacts.  This arrangement of expertise is 
acceptable so long as the organization’s mission is related to offensive operations and 
its associated degradation and destruction of enemy militaries.  
 
Figure 3: PMESII - Targeting Overview [5] 
 Figure 3 represents this trinity of staff capabilities and their relative 
contributions to the joint targeting process.  Here, the operations capabilities are 
provided by the aforementioned combat trained personnel.  As a process, formal 
military targeting follows Figure 4, and both begins and ends with the Commander’s 
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objectives and end state.  We will use this generalized targeting template in Chapter 
Three to overlay how the methods of this thesis would apply within the existing 
construct of the military decision making process. 
 
Figure 4: Joint Targeting Cycle [5] 
2.8.2 Strategy and Clausewitz 
 The intent for this section is not to provide an expansive or historical view of 
military strategies, but to provide a link between strategy and targeting in the form an 
introduction to Clausewitzian Centers of Gravity (CoG).  The Joint DoD definition of 
strategy is, “The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national 
power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or 
multinational objectives [40].”  Here, the instruments of national power refer to the so-
called Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) powers.  Under the 
military form of national power, military strategists look at degrading or influencing 
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the entire spectrum of an enemy’s instruments of national power.  While multiple 
military philosophers’ opinions on national strategy provide an excellent backdrop 
against which we may couch current strategic thinking, only one adds clarity to our 
problem of mathematically describing the frequency and strength of inter-system 
relations and their subsequent targeting for a specified effect.  The DoD draws 
substantially on one particular strategic term that any analyst must be prepared to 
address: the ‘Center of Gravity.’   
 Carl von Clausewitz’s (1780-1831) concept of the enemy’s CoG was most 
likely a metaphor borrowed from the mechanical sciences, an older term for physics, 
of his time.  To Clausewitz, the CoG was, “…always found where the mass is most 
concentrated, and just as every blow directed against the body’s center of gravity 
yields the greatest effect, and—moreover—the strongest blow is the one achieved by 
the center of gravity, the same is true in war [41].”  Some in the operational and 
tactical sphere of operations have taken this concept very literally and determined 
enemy CoGs based on their highest concentration of forces or upon the highest density 
of capability.  This interpretation follows localized intuition in that this method 
produces highly effective ways to destroy an enemy’s ability to fight, but in the 
strategic frame, may not produce the desired effect or address the larger issue of 
adversary will.  Indeed, even Clausewitz recognized that an enemy’s CoG may be 
external to the armed forces or may even lie with an ally to that force if that ally is the 
dominate entity in an enemy coalition [41].   
 Here, contextual caution must be exercised.  Clausewitz was a veteran of the 
Napoleonic Wars in the early 18th century.  Wars and battles during this period were 
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fought using linearly arrayed men marching mass formations in open field; 
concentrations of artillery, volley fire, and organizational courage were the usual 
determining factors in the outcome of a discrete battle.  In his critique of current use of 
CoGs in military doctrine, Echevarria argues strategists, military or otherwise, should 
think of a CoG as a focal point that serves as a unifying force that sustains enemy 
action or forces [42].  This last interpretation of focal points is supported by our later 
calculations and resembles Figure 5 below.  In military terms, there can be multiple 
operational CoGs; however, they must all be ‘nested’ or supporting the strategic 
objectives and with them, affect the strategic CoG. 
 
Figure 5: Operational Environment [43] 
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2.8.3 Military Metrics 
 Operational requirements are functions of the PMESII concept; PMESII stands 
for political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure.  In simulation 
and military doctrinal terms, PMESII are treated as state variables that represent the 
‘current state of the system’ for which entity is under analysis.  Consequently, this is why 
PMESII is located under the intelligence prevue in Figure 3; the military intelligence 
community is currently charged with measuring PMESII effects.  Furthermore, the DIME 
concept revolves around actions that could be introduced to the system to inspire changes 
in the PMESII state variables.  These are measures used to establish measures of merit 
against which missions and targets are ranked.  In Chapter Three, this research will build 
on the centrality foundations as well as weighting methods of Chapter Two and apply 
them to a phase strategic targeting methodology which is both dependent on objectives 
and the Phase of War.    
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III. Methodology 
“A problem well stated is a problem half solved” 
- Charles Kettering 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on theoretical and applied methods for describing a 
strategic level complex system.  It will be demonstrated that a large system, say a 
country, can be adequately described by structuring its institutions into two separate 
networks: the dependency and will networks.  The undirected dependency networks 
are composed of vital civilian infrastructure, food and water systems, and system wide 
communications.  Arrays of infrastructure and existence of military bases and units are 
relatively stable; information systems might be constantly fluctuating with regard to 
capacity and content but existence and persistence of information systems as well as 
their underpinning infrastructure are adequately stable to be described with 
dependency networks.  The directed ‘will networks’ are composed of mostly human 
driven systems such as political institutions, social sectors, and commercial centers; 
these networks capture unbalanced relationships and might be characterized as 
influence networks.  Subsequently, multiple treatments of our dependency and will 
networks will be explored and analyzed.  The goal of this research is to 
mathematically determine infrastructure ‘Centers of Dependency’ from our 
dependency networks and analogous ‘Centers of Will’ from our will networks.   
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3.2 Proposal and PMESII Deconstruction 
 This first step in this method begins with a suitably large example and 
construction of a notional set of networks upon which we can act.  As previously 
stated in Section 1.2, constructing these networks is sensitive in nature and requires 
access to means and methods not within the scope of this research.  For this method to 
apply, the entity under analysis must be sufficiently complex so as to allow for the 
construction of supportive networks.  Because this research is designed to identify key 
systems or institutions for further influence or action, calculations must be performed 
against sets of targets to array them against the accomplishment of some effect.  As 
Allen states, “…effects-based operation is the employment of all instruments of 
national power [DIME] against opposing [PMESII] capabilities to create a desired 
effect or end state.” [44]   
 
Figure 6: PMESII - A System of Systems Understanding [45] 
 Therefore, the goal for this method is to inform a Whole of Government 
approach to strategic targeting.  In order to accomplish this, separate PMESII 
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attributes of an adversary entity into separate networks representing each PMESII 
attribute.  The first subset of networks will include so-called “hard” networks of 
physical structures that can be represented as undirected, with binary valued edges that 
indicate either the existence or non-existence of relationship.  These networks are the 
‘Dependency Networks’ as they represent physical infrastructure such as 
telecommunications nodes, electrical power grids, water, food, and emergency 
services systems.  Considering military specific targets and informational systems, the 
Dependency Networks contain the Military, Infrastructure and Information attributes 
from an adversary’s PMESII capabilities.  Another discriminator for dependency 
networks, other than characterizing the relationships between the nodes, is the fact that 
systems within these networks do not change quickly over time.     
The remaining PMESII attributes, political, economy, and social will rely more 
on time dependent trends and localized effects and as such, will require Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) elicited influence-based networks classified as ‘Will Networks.’  The 
will networks describing the P, S, and E attributes will therefore resemble the 
dependency networks except that, in place of binary linkages, we will have continuous 
directed influence probabilities between 0 and 1 within systems.  For example, to 
construct the P (political) matrix, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) would provide input 
to capture the influences between political entities or offices and other members of the 
political arena.  Figure 7 below shows an overview of how these networks feed the 
larger decision context of this research: 
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Figure 7: Strategic Targeting Process Overview 
 Once these networks are constructed, an attribute weighting by Phase of War, 
Wi, where i = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5} representing our six doctrinal Phases of War is 
elicited.  These weights should adhere to Equation 9 below and sum to one during 
each Phase of War.  The Phase of War determination and the ancillary weighting of 
each of PMESII layered will produce the first weighting matrix in this process.  This 
will be a matrix that describes how important each attribute within the PMESII model 
is most important to a decision maker within each Phase of War.  Then we will 
perform centrality measures on each attribute network, Cj, individually based on the 
objective set against that network.  Here, j contains the set of our PMESII layers, or 
𝑗 = {𝑃,𝑀,𝐸, 𝑆, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑟𝑎, 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜}.  This will produce six weighted lists, {Sj} for each 
attribute layer, each of which will be normalized and multiplied by its respective 
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Phase of War weight as appropriate to the Phase of War of interest.  The normalization 
method utilized with respect to each centrality measure will be the ‘2-norm’ 
formulated generally by equation 8: 
 2 1/2
2
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i
C x C x C x= ∑  (8) 
Equation 8 produces the set of normalized centrality measures for a particular 
attribute regardless of which measure is used.  This normalization method is used in order 
to prevent centrality measures which might score in whole numbers (e.g. Degree 
Centrality) from overwhelming the value model while still maintaining internal ordinal 
ranking and relative scale between scores.  These weighted and scored systems will then 
be combined in one list, {Si, Total}, which will produce a weighted, scored and combined 
master list of systems ordered by importance which could then be used to assign limited 
resources in the most beneficial way possible.  Of note, the set {Si, Total} is indexed by 
Phase of War.  Therefore, each Phase of War will have its own unique master list of 
systems due to the weights within the ith phase as well as the set of objectives described 
by our attribute Cj’s.  Equation 11 shows how this method constructs a weighted list from 
our attribute networks, Gj(V,E). 
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3.3 Constructing the Network 
 As previously stated, the scope of this thesis does not detail trade secrets or 
classified methods by which a business or government would create these networks.  
However, this section will discuss the general scale of the problem.  Building the 
military network for inclusion as a Dependency Network would require a deeper 
analysis than simply locations of military bases.  Not only would such a network need 
to represent concentration of weapons and personnel, but it would also account for 
systems such as Petroleum, Oil, and Lubrication (POL) concentrations, transportation 
nodes, command and control nodes, railway systems (for the transportation of heavy 
ground based weaponry), and depot level maintenance facilities.  The inclusion of 
these various supporting networks might also be a function of the current Phase of 
War.  For example, if Iraq was using this method to analyze weaknesses within the 
American Military during the 2003 Invasion, considering strategic infrastructure 
within the continental United States would not have had an effect on tactical American 
Armor incursions into Baghdad.   The timeline for OIF Phase Three (Dominate) 
limited Iraq’s options from the strategic to the operational/tactical timeline; and thus it 
decreased the set of viable targets for inclusion in the analysis.   
 With this example in mind, we must introduce the concept of effects-based 
operations over time.  This effect over time is used to distinguish a “strategic effect” 
from an “operational effect.”  Furthermore, the strategic effects of interest are also a 
function of the Phase of War that currently characterizes relations with an adversary.  
Changing Iraq’s point of view to a Phase Two (Seize Initiative) against the United 
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States, their strategic options would be legion and include both Center of Will targets 
(Congressional lobbying, appealing to the UN, and direct engagement with the 
American people, etc) and Center of Dependency targets (port of Kuwait, US troop 
masses and booby trapping key bridges, etc). 
3.3.1 Data and Subject Matter Experts 
 As previously stated, the methods and best practices of building the networks 
required for this method will vary wildly based on the target entity and, in practice, 
include classified methods and means that are therefore rightly beyond the scope of this 
paper.  As a tool for an analyst to employ this method, there are certain patterns within 
existing literature which may illustrate specific PMESII layers.  Once systems are 
identified and targeted within these layers and are modeled in higher resolution for 
operational exploitation, the network nature of some of these systems may in fact lend 
themselves to other network constructions like bipartite or min/max flow type graphs.  
Furthermore, the social network specifically might combinatorially expand if the 
operational and tactical objectives are not properly scoped through the use of a strategic 
method like the one purposed here. 
3.4 Phase of War Considerations 
 JP 3-60 and JP 3-0 are military joint publications, and succinctly characterize 
the various Phases of War and their respective mission types [5].  Due to its military 
source, the figure below has activities starting in Phase One; however, this method is a 
Whole of Government approach and therefore must consider the adversary networks 
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through all phases of war because the military is not the only national source of power 
available. 
 
Figure 8: Doctrinal Phase of War Activity Levels [43] 
For the purposes of this research, the meaning behind phrases like “OPLAN 
Approval” and “OPORD Activation” found in Figure 8 will not be discussed at length 
due to their military specific meaning and application.  Phase Zero (Shaping 
Operations) is characterized by diplomatic and cooperative efforts seeking to influence 
both adversary and ally behavior alike.  For the purposes of this thesis, Phase Zero 
objectives focus on illuminating dark networks via diplomatic and economic exposure 
and intelligence gathering.  Phase One (Deter) is characterized by dissuading an 
adversary from a course of action and setting conditions if the international 
relationship should degrade further.  In military terms, this usually means conducting 
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special exercises and limited mobilization as a confirmation of the will to act.  Phase 
Two (Seize Initiative) is a more forceful phase aimed at immediately halting some 
offending or aggressive behavior.  Typical activities in this phase will transition from 
passive intelligence gathering and strategic influence to active intelligence gathering 
and operational timeframe influence and effects based missions.  Phase Three 
(Dominate) flows naturally from Phase Two if the adversary does not immediately 
capitulate.  It is during this phase that we utilize the target list from our method 
operationally instead of strategically and monitor how the adversary networks react 
and recover.  If an attack on the Will and Dependency Networks could be conducted 
in such a fashion that a swift victory is achieved and subsequent network function 
could be restored to their previous performance, then not only can a transition from 
Phase Three occur quickly, but the time spent in Phase Four (Stabilize Operations) is 
minimized.  Speaking in terms of graph theory, Phase Three is when active efforts are 
used to remove edges and nodes and Phase Four is where we attempt to insert friendly 
substitute edges and nodes to take their place with the goal of moving the target entity 
toward stability.  Phase Five (Enable Civil Authority) represents a removal of friendly 
nodes and edges and supplanting them with native nodes to return the adversary to 
indigenous control.   
3.4.1 Phase of War Value Measures 
 At the onset of this method, we must elicit the relative importance of the PMESII 
spheres from our decision maker with respect to a particular target using any method 
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described in Section 2.6.  Let us consider the notional country of ‘Atlantia’ whose elicited 
PMESII vs. Phase of War chart resembles Table 3 below:  
Table 3: Altantia Attribute Weight by Phase of War 
 
 For this notional decision maker, Table 3 indicates that our strategic weights favor 
the political attribute layer for all but the military focused Phase Three.  Another 
characteristic of this chart is that all weights obey Equation 9 over a particular Phase of 
War and sum to one.  This property may be relaxed at the decision maker’s discretion, 
however, each column for each Phase of War must sum to the same number to maintain 
relational comparability.   For example, if Phase of War weights summed to 50 or 0.5, so 
long as the relative importance from one layer to another is maintained, this method will 
produce the same ordinal ranking of targets in the master target list.  This is the main 
reason why the values calculated in the set {Si, Total} do not have the same utility 
interpretation as a Value Focused Thinking or other utility theory compliant models 
might.  
While it would certainly be convenient to have this for planning an entire 
campaign through all six phases of war, in reality, these values would need to be 
confirmed periodically.  This is especially true if the decision maker changes during the 
campaign, as the adversary network brightens as a result of our activities or strategic 
0 1 2 3 4 5
P 0.3 0.4 0.35 0.2 0.35 0.35
M 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.35 0.2 0.05
E 0.2 0.25 0.12 0.1 0.2 0.35
S 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05
Info 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.05
Infra 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.04 0.15
Phase of War
A
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values/goals change, or a particular network is more resilient to alteration/influence than 
anticipated.  The analyst should be ultimately concerned with the weights of all six 
measures and exercise caution: a careful and accurate consideration of these values will 
determine strategic ‘targetability’ of all the nodes within the attribute matrices.  If done 
haphazardly, resulting actions could extremely over-attrite one network at the expense of 
others resulting in unnecessary damage, wasted monetary investment or even failure of 
the original overarching strategic intent.  Therefore, sensitivity analysis of the weights 
should be done to determine how robust the target list is to the elicited values.   
3.5 Objective Sensitive Centrality 
In order to capture the relative importance within these networks of systems, 
this method employs centrality measure calculations.  Indeed, therein lays the strength 
of this process: different strategic objectives can be captured using appropriate 
centrality measures.  This research utilizes four measures to illustrate the process, but 
in reality there are dozens of centrality measures that an analyst could employ to 
capture nuance within a decision maker’s intent.  Performing such objective sensitive 
centrality measures to the Dependency Networks (Military, Informational and 
Infrastructure layers) produces the “Centers of Dependency.”  Likewise, performing 
objective sensitive centrality measures on the Will Networks yields the ranked list of 
the adversary’s “Centers of Will.”   
The question then becomes how an analyst can interpret objectives into a 
centrality measure.  In order to do this, one must elicit enough detail about the 
strategic objective to marry the decision maker’s intent to the mathematics of the 
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centrality measure.  For instance, if a decision maker states, “I want to know what is 
going on inside ‘Atlantia’,” the analyst must focus on the type of information and 
insight the decision maker desires.  He/she may want insight into Atlantia’s political 
decision making, mood/opinions of the indigenous population, or current flow of 
certain economic staples.  In a data collection scenario, focusing on the most highly 
connected systems in a particular PMESII network might be valid.  Given an early 
stage of war and unknown size network, collecting information on a highly connected 
system is the logical starting position.  In Section 3.6, a notional country example 
illustrates the entire methodology.   
3.6 Sample Network Example 
 For illustration, we construct six random networks to represent our six attribute 
graphs using any method available.  Here, the Prescribed Node Degree, Connected Graph 
(PNDCG) [46] algorithm is used to produce graphs of various node size and various 
settings.  The settings of the PNDCG that build our networks for this example are located 
in Appendix A.  A summarized chart of the networks built for this example is located 
below in Table 4.  To present a degree of realism, different sized graphs are used with 
different probability values for connectedness.   
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Table 4: Example Network Snapshot 
 
As an example for this simple scenario, the Military layer for the sample set of 
graphs is below in Figure 9.  Note that MATLAB produces a set of cycle arrows to 
represent an undirected graph. 
 
Figure 9: Sample Military Network 
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 Utilizing the ‘Attribute Weight versus Phase of War’ chart located in Table 3 in 
Section 3.4.1, consider a scenario within in Phase One (Deter) concerning the notional 
country of ‘Atlantia’ against whom the following objectives are established: 
1. Ease restrictive trade practices (political sphere) 
2. Examine import flow of goods and services (economic sphere) 
3. Increase positive perception of our country within their population (social sphere) 
4. Identify main infrastructure hubs (infrastructure sphere) 
5. Identify military installations that serve as key pre-deployment training and 
equipment depots (military sphere) 
6. Determine the most influential information systems in Atlantia (information sphere) 
3.6.1 Centrality Decisions 
 Examining the objectives will determine the most appropriate centrality measure 
to produce a strategic target list against these objectives.  For objective one, the decision 
maker is interested in a political effect.  Therefore, a defendable choice exists between 
degree or eigenvector centrality within the political attribute graph in order to identify 
key offices or political systems with which favor may be curried to achieve that effect.  
The choice between these two measures depends on the accessibility of the highly 
connected offices, systems within the political graph, or if using the most influential 
systems linked to the most highly connected nodes (eigenvector centrality) would be 
more appropriate.  For this research, eigenvector centrality is used to simulate a 
preference to systems or offices with less overt prestige in order to minimize public 
exposure to friendly efforts. 
 Objective two is tied to intelligence gathering and asks for a flow of goods and 
services.  Under these circumstances, the betweenness centrality is most appropriate and 
will produce an ordered list of economic systems that handle the most economic 
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throughput.  Objective three seeks to discover the most influential of the social systems 
for either positive messaging operations or monitoring of negative opinion trends of 
Atlantia.  While eigenvector centrality is usually a good candidate for influential nodes, 
closeness centrality will be utilized.  Closeness is favored in this case because with a 
systems view of the social will network, we are interested in sampling the most active 
social systems which can reach the greatest number of other systems through the fewest 
connections.  This is predicated mainly on electronic shortest path connections; therefore 
the systems on the shortest paths between other systems in a social setting are defendable.  
 Objective four is a straight forward degree centrality candidate.  This list will 
produce the hubs of all major infrastructures: water, gas, civilian transportation, airports, 
and so forth.  Identification of these hubs will serve developmental, military, 
humanitarian or other operational objectives.  Objective five implies another betweenness 
centrality measure.  Military units usually flow through the same collective training 
locations and aerial/sea points of debarkation for deployment and as such would be 
identified using between centrality.  Betweenness also aids in identifying key movement 
nodes in the case of a national deployment; this could aid military planners in structuring 
intelligence assets for clarity on Atlantia’s military procedures.  Lastly, objective six 
seeks to identify influential information systems.  This is another candidate for 
eigenvector analysis due to the influential nature of the requested targets.  Degree 
centrality would identify the information systems that are most connected; because the 
target is influential information systems, this implies interest in the nodes that might 
provide the content to those highly connected systems.  Eigenvector centrality will favor 
and identify these systems. 
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3.6.2 Performing Centrality 
 For the next step of the method, it is required to calculate the various centrality 
measures against the attribute networks.  For this example, the output from the PNDCG is 
a series of edge lists which are imported into Microsoft Excel.  The nodes are re-ordered 
to begin at node one (the PNDCG starts at node 0).  Centrality measures are then 
calculated in MATLAB on these modified edge lists.  The centrality measures are 
normalized using the 2-norm as stated at the conclusion of Section 3.2 and each ordered 
centrality list is then multiplied by its Phase of War weight.  Once these calculations are 
complete, it is a simple matter to array all six lists into one list and sort it in descending 
normalized centrality order.  Below is the top forty non-Phase of War weighted systems 
juxtaposed with the Phase One weighting scheme proposed in Table 3, as a result of this 
method: 
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Table 5: Unweighted Final Target List 
 
Table 6: Phase One Weighted Target 
List 
 
 As can be seen, the non-Phase of War weighted list in Table 5, shows that overall, 
no one layer or centrality measure dominates the method due to the normalization.  The 
Phase of War weighted list in Table 6 favors the political attribute as designed, but other 
attributes are still present in the top forty.  It is significant to mention that over 98% (425 
of 430) of all systems within these sample graphs had weighted centrality scores below 
0.1.  This reiterates the great care that must be taken in eliciting the Phase of War 
50 
weights, as weights out to three significant figures could prove substantial in the ordering 
of the final strategic target list. 
3.7 The Final Weighted Target List 
 After performing this method and producing a weighted list, it becomes necessary 
to examine two questions: What insight does this list provide and what can be done once 
it has been obtained?  Effectively, what this method has done is create a network proxy of 
a real system; it mathematically captures an overarching objective against every layer of 
that system; and lastly it weighs each layer’s objective dependant target list on the current 
state of affairs between the analyzing entity and the analyzed entity.  This gained insight 
provides repeatable, traceable and defendable relative importance for every system in the 
representative proxy of PMESII layers.  This addresses the constant concern of 
employing limited resources against a complex adversary and achieves the greatest 
strategic effect.  With such a final weighted target list, any leader could delegate actions 
effectively and efficiently across every capability or agency at their disposal.  However, it 
is vital to note that targeting and effects are an iterative process.  The key to this process 
is the assessment and adjustment loop in Figure 7.  Once the targeting process is 
complete and friendly capabilities are acting on some element of the identified systems, 
the networks will react.  Thus, a new snapshot of these layers must be accomplished to 
aid not only a new iteration of targeting, but also an assessment of the effects achieved 
over the last iteration of actions.  Only then can an analyst provide a DM with the insight 
required to declare strategic success or failure, assess any changes in the Phase of War, or 
reassess the weights within the current Phase of War.  
51 
IV. Analysis and Results 
“Tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement;  
strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.”  
- Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the results obtained from the method in Chapter Three.  
Searches in literature provide no examples of applications of this type to describe sets of 
PMESII strategic networks as a whole; therefore, existing case studies do not exist 
against which this method might be objectively evaluated.  With this in mind, the way 
forward includes examining robustness to network size and sensitivity to weights.  First, 
the method will be tested through the inclusion of a single large network to ensure that 
results are node and edge density independent.  Then this method will be applied to a 
realistic set of exemplar graphs created from real data.  Finally, sensitivity to Phase of 
War valuations as well as transitions from one phase to another is examined. 
4.2 Single Large Network Robustness 
In order to be general and useful, the methodology in Chapter Three must be 
robust and offer meaningful insights and results for all conceivable size and density of 
networks.  To test this robustness, the randomly generated networks in Chapter Three 
will be systematically replaced with networks based on real world phenomena.  For this 
section, the social layer network from the example in Chapter Three is replaced by a real 
world example utilizing a ‘Facebook-like’ network first used by Dr. Opsahl in 2009 [47].  
Using the weighted static one-mode network (weighted by number of messages), while 
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keeping the rest of the networks from Chapter Three constant, an examination of the 
impact of the much larger network on this method can be accomplished.  This ‘Facebook-
like’ network contained 1899 nodes with well over 20,000 edges, as well as four distinct 
connected graphs or ‘components.’  When closeness centrality is applied to this network 
in the same fashion as the previous randomly generated social layer from Chapter Three, 
the largest or ‘giant’ component must first be isolated.  If this step is eliminated, then 
most closeness centrality algorithms (as a function of assuming a connected network for 
all centrality calculations) return a zero value due to the infinite ‘farness’ calculation of 
the distance between two nodes that are not connected within the graph.  Eliminating 
isolates for this research was done in MATLAB; however there are many techniques and 
software which may automate the process [48].  In so doing, this method reiterates a well 
known limitation in the application SNA generally, namely almost all centrality measures 
assume a connected graph and reality is not constrained to be necessarily connected.  At 
the strategic level, small numbers of isolated systems might be ignored so long as those 
systems are truly isolated and their influence on the rest of the strategic system layer is 
null.  In the case of the ‘Facebook like’ data, the isolates were three pairs of individuals 
sending messages only within their respective pairs.   
Once the largest component is isolated, it is a relatively straight forward process 
to calculate closeness.  As with the PNDCG random graphs from Chapter Three, the 
closeness calculation here is performed using MATLAB.  The results are then exported to 
Microsoft Excel and re-ordered largest to smallest to produce a similar product to the 
output lists from Chapter Three.  The top forty nodes in this new social layer network are 
displayed in Table 7 below: 
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Table 7: Normalized Large Social Layer Centrality 
 
When compared to Table 5 from Chapter Three, it is obvious that normalized 
closeness values in Table 7 are approximately an order of magnitude lower than the 
original unweighted target list.  This unfavorable order of magnitude comparison is not 
unique to closeness centrality.  Examining Table 8, it appears both normalized 
eigenvector and closeness centralities either degrade too quickly or produce relatively 
lower numbers to compete directly with normalized degree and betweenness centrality.  
When the network in question is very large, then closeness centrality is initially 
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dominated by the normalized values of the other measures for at the highest positions of 
the target list.  
Table 8: All Normalized Measures for the Large Social Layer 
 
This does not necessarily mean that closeness centrality is a ‘bad’ or incorrect 
measure with which to approximate a commander’s objective.  However, it does imply 
that the analyst should ensure that closeness truly captures the objective when the 
network is large and densely connected.  An examination of the last target number rows 
in Table 8 shows that closeness does produce values that are on the order of magnitude 
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and directly comparable.  While closeness centrality may not produce targets within a 
Center of Will or Center of Gravity, closeness still represents a viable mathematical 
interpretation of a DM’s objective and will still produce targets represented in the top 1% 
of system nodes.  In the example in Section 3.6.1, closeness centrality was purposely 
used to display this limitation; with the new social layer being much larger as compared 
to the other layers, betweenness or degree centrality might be better suited to answer the 
decision maker’s objective of “increasing positive perception.”  In a large network, the 
‘increasing positive perception’ objective could be interpreted as so-called gate keeper or 
‘go between’ influence.  Also of note is the fact that eigenvector, betweenness, and 
degree centrality, for this network, share nine of the top forty nodes or 22.5% 
(highlighted in Table 8).  Betweenness and degree centrality for this network share thirty-
three of the top forty nodes or 82.5% and maintain a directly comparable scale.  
Therefore, once a particular network becomes very large, targeting based on closeness 
may lose its interpretation and as such must be re-examined.   
4.3 The Full Exemplar Substitution 
Now that repercussions of performing certain centrality measures over an 
overwhelmingly large single system have been demonstrated and examined, all graphs 
from the generated example in Chapter Three are replaced by exemplar networks created 
from sets of real world networks to function as proxies for a set of PMESII networks.  As 
previously stated, there is no available pool of data which describes all PMESII layers 
regarding a single sufficiently large entity.  Therefore, the next step in validation will 
examine attribute-like networks and their behavior under this method. 
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4.3.1 Choosing the Networks 
The choice of exemplar networks in this section is designed to not only use real 
life networks that could reasonably approximate its applicable PMESII layer, but also test 
the validity of this method against disparate sized networks.  For the PMESII layers in 
this section, the PNDCG algorithm is used to create undirected exemplar graphs using six 
real-world data sets.  The settings for all PNDCG exemplar graphs within this section can 
be found in Appendix B.  Note that the distribution file is the same in all the settings 
because the exemplar graph creating function within the PNDCG algorithm requires the 
file to run, but does not use the values within the file for connectedness calculations in 
the final graphs.   
The first exemplar is created from the facebook-like network from Section 4.2, 
producing a weighted graph.  The information layer is produced via the California Web 
Graph from Kleinberg’s datasets [49].   Next, the graph generated from the sequencing of 
the C. elegans organism worm’s neural network [50] is used to represent a dense political 
system of systems.  Each of the political, information and social graphs were weighted 
after their creation using the random number generator function in Microsoft Excel prior 
to performing centrality measures.  For the proxy economic layer, a highly connected yet 
binary blogging network from Adamic and Glance [51] forms the basis of the exemplar 
graph.  This graph was chosen to replicate a highly complex and integrated economy of a 
developed modern nation.  The military network is also representative of a highly 
advanced entity; the exemplar use to describe it came from the densely connected 500 
busiest airports network [52].  Lastly, the infrastructure network exemplar is based on the 
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Western US power grid network also used by Watts and Strogatz [53].  A summary of all 
exemplar networks is located in Table 9 below:  
Table 9: Full Exemplar Substitution Summary 
 
4.3.2 Targeting the Full Exemplar Substitution  
 The same calculations performed in Chapter Three are now repeated against the 
full set of exemplar graphs which represent the new PMESII layers.  The only change in 
the method is betweenness centrality is substituted for closeness centrality when 
evaluating the social layer.  Degree centrality is still used for the infrastructure layer.  In 
Table 10 below, we see the Unweighted Master Target List produced by this 
methodology.   
 As in Table 5 and Table 6, Table 10 is shaded to indicate the different layers 
represented in the top forty targets.  As seen in Table 10, it is obvious that scale has no 
impact on dominance as it pertains to node count or edge density.  However, similar to 
the social layer under closeness centrality in Section 4.2, the infrastructure layer is 
missing from the top forty targets due to the choice of the degree centrality measure.  The 
first occurrence of an infrastructure target is target number 125; this is still within the top 
1% of nodes for our total system of 18,500 system nodes.   Of note, if the social layer 
objective was calculated with closeness centrality, the first appearance of a social target 
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system would have been target number 136; this is also still within the top 1% of nodes 
for our total system.   
Table 10: Unweighted Exemplar Target List 
 
 Therefore, with the results reflected in Table 10, given the disparity between node 
density and connectedness of our six realistic PMESII layers, it can be concluded that this 
method is robust to the not only node density and edge density, but also to the choice of 
centrality measure as well.  That is not to say the final target list is robust to these factors.  
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Each of these factors will influence the various target nodes that appear in the final 
ordered strategic target list.  This robustness conclusion simply means that these three 
factors will not result in dominance of one layer over another based solely on its 
characteristics or targeting objective.  
4.4 Robustness by Weights and Phase of War  
 The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the sensitivity of this method to the 
Phase of War weights elicited from a decision maker.  Additionally, this section 
demonstrates the difference between target lists from two different Phases of War.  As 
implied from Section 3.4.1, the exact ordering of the final target list produced by this 
method is marginally sensitive to the weights elicited for each Phase of War.  Table 10 
from the previous section illustrate that this method is very robust to both node density 
and edge density of any respective PMESII layers we might utilize.     
 
4.4.1 Weight Sensitivity 
 Examining the results of this method so far, the final value for each system across 
all layers appears unique to four or five significant digits.  To answer how sensitive this 
method is the significant figures of the Phase of War weights, consider Table 12 and 
Table 13 below.  Table 12 is calculated by applying the original weights for Phase Three.  
Table 13 was produced using alternate Phase Three weights.  Table 11 depicts the 
weights used to produce the results in Table 12 and Table 13 respectively. 
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Table 11: Original and Alternate Phase Three Weights 
 
From Table 12 and Table 13 below, the full target list changes order slightly when 
alternate Phase Three weights are applied.  The military, economy, and political layers’ 
nodes within the top forty changed an average of 2.13, 2.75, 2.31 positions respectively.  
The social layer’s nodes changed an average of 32 positions.  Though this change 
removes social layer targets from the top forty, this is not significant given that all six 
layers taken together sum to a total of 18,500 nodes.  In terms of providing insight, this 
movement in position may alter a DM’s perspective on the relative importance between 
the layers.  However, in terms of assigning targets to capability within an organization, 
this is insignificant within 1% of the targeted nodes. 
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Table 12: Phase Three Target List 
 
 
Table 13: Phase Three Alternate 
Target List 
4.4.2 Phase of War Sensitivity 
 It is well known in military planning circles that friction exists during periods of 
transition, but this truism is not unique to the military.  This observation is true for almost 
any transition at any level: political leadership changes, corporate restructuring/evolution, 
personal major life events and shocks to group dynamics.  From a military perspective, 
this lesson was violently apparent during the transition from major combat operations to 
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civil stability operations during OIF.  In terms of this model, operations conducted after 
the declaration of the end of major combat operations made by then President George W. 
Bush on 1 May 2003 on board the USS Abraham Lincoln, should have been conducted 
under the strategic target list produced by Phase Four objectives and weights.  
 Unfortunately, the adversary maintained a level of military action that interfered 
with the US led coalition’s ability to target according to Phase Four objectives and held 
the country of Iraq awkwardly between Phases Three and Four.  One could argue that the 
Iraqi insurgency following the end to major combat operations resulted from an over 
attrition of the military PMESII network (not only through direct force on force attrition, 
but also from dismantling the Iraqi armed forces during reconstruction) as well as 
improper targeting of the social and informational layers. 
 This apparent disparity between the phases and the stark differences in how each 
phase is weighted is illustrated when Table 14 below is directly compared to Table 12 
above.  Note that the objectives concerning the PMESII layers have not changed; this 
represents a declaration of transition without an alteration in strategic objectives to 
accompany it.  Table 14 was calculated using the same centrality measures as Table 12 
and weighted according to the Phase Four weights from Table 3. 
63 
Table 14: Phase Four Weighted Target List 
 
 As can be seen by comparing Table 12 and Table 14, this transition produces an 
entirely different set of priorities for strategic targeting even given the exact same ordinal 
organization of the PMESII layers produced from the centrality measures.  For the 
purposes of this research, this shows that strategic priorities can be captured through 
careful elicitation of Phase of War weights.  In model implementation terms, the 
differences between Table 12 and Table 14 are significant enough to consider a 
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continuous function during a transition phase anchored at the departing phase value and 
terminating at the entering phase value. 
4.5 Conclusion 
 While inadequate unclassified data exists to directly validate this method, this 
chapter has shown robustness to node density, edge density and centrality measure.  
Phase of War weights will produce very different target lists which reflect the strategic 
vision for that specific phase; however the implementation of this method may require 
the addition of transition phase functions which will smooth the strategic target lists from 
one phase to another.  This research and methodology is unique due to the robustness of 
this model and the insights that might be gained at the strategic echelon. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
“Many, who should know better, think that wars can be decided by soulless machines, 
rather than by the blood and anguish of brave men.” 
- George S. Patton Jr. 
5.1 Study Summary 
 In summary, this study formulated and demonstrated a method through which a 
complex and chaotic strategic level problem could be captured.  The techniques described 
in this research can be applied to international relations, military operations, and 
transnational business.  Though expressed in terms of military and government 
operations, there is nothing within this research that would limit the application of this 
methodology to strictly governmental concerns.  However, in military terms, what this 
research does convey is what may have once been considered a single target, can be 
considered many independent systems within different PMESII layers.  For example a 
particularly large military base might have rail transportation through it, significant 
economic impact to its surroundings, a large infrastructural footprint, large social input as 
well as significant political sway due to the population (assuming representative form of 
government) of soldiers at the base.  To a current military planner, such an installation 
may represent a single target; however, under this method, systems that represent the 
base are separate and may only by ‘important’ within a specific PMESII layer.  Once 
performed, this method then tacitly indicates which DIME element should be applied to 
the target system. 
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5.2 Method Overview 
This research created strategic target lists using the objective-based importance of 
systems within PMESII layers and weighted by the applicable Phases of War.  In so 
doing, it has been demonstrated that not only can strategic objectives be captured in the 
form of centrality measures, but it is also possible to weight objective-base centrality 
measures, within specific PMESII layers, against one another, to obtain an overall 
strategic targeting list.  Furthermore, to include the dynamic nature of conflict across the 
continuum of war, this method can be iterated across all Phases of War to reflect the 
DM’s changing values as it pertains to strategic targeting and target lists.  This research 
draws upon the military contributions in the SNA field from several contributors, notably 
Clark, Geffre, Morris, McGuire and Hamill as well as the theoretical underpinnings of 
traditional SNA from Borgatti, Carley, Wasserman and Faust.  The method discussed 
within this research then builds a strategic military targeting and Clauswitzian targeting 
framework upon the foundation of SNA.  As a result, this research provides the military 
analysis community with a tool for allowing a decision maker insight into complex 
strategic level problems.  
5.3 Objectives of Research 
The primary objective of this research was to expose complex system-of-systems 
strategic problems to SNA measures and create a weighted additive model for producing 
strategic targeting lists.  Without delving into the means and methods of constructing 
such networks, this research showed that constructing network representations of 
adversary PMESII layers, applying objective-based centrality measures to the layers, and 
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then weighing and combining the resultant sets produces a viable first step in strategic 
targeting.   
5.4 Significance Contributions of Research 
The method described in this research represents a natural progression of military 
applications of SNA theory.  The contributions from this new approach are threefold.  
First, it demonstrates that a decision maker’s objectives might be captured with a 
centrality measure.  Once accomplished, this measure can be applied against the target 
network to produce a viable 1 to n ranking of all target nodes within the network.  
Second, it suggests a change in the way strategic problems are framed.  By focusing on 
the PMESII layers and how they are constructed and weighted before assigning 
objectives against them ensures that the target country or entity is reviewed holistically, 
not through an effect-based microscope.  The last contribution of this research is to show 
that, in a system-of-systems representation, it is possible to calculate a Clausewitz Center 
of Gravity.  The interpretation here is that such a center of gravity is dependent on the 
objective or effect a decision maker wishes to impart as well as the Phase of War during 
which the decision is made.  The Joint Publication 1-02 definition a center of gravity is 
“the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or the 
will to act.” [40] In this research, through calculations against the dependency and will 
networks, we have effectively found PMESII centers of gravity in a mathematically 
defensible and traceable fashion. 
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5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 While this method is a new approach for insights into the strategic targeting 
process, it can be strengthened with the addition of follow on research.  Over the course 
of this research there were many topics that were not included.  First and foremost, the 
current sets of centrality measures need to be examined for use in describing military 
objectives and mission sets.  The four measures used in this research were for illustrative 
purposes.  This implies that follow on research could also examine the creation of more 
sophisticated measures which more accurately capture the nuance of a DM’s objectives 
and compare results to comparable networks used here.  Further, additional research into 
this method could include methods to incorporate multiple objectives within each layer.  
This might involve weighed centrality measures or confounding the measures in some 
fashion to reflect a combined objective.   
 As to the networks themselves, this research made use of connections ranging 
from zero to one.  Follow on research could extend the range of relational strengths to 
negative one to zero range to incorporate negative effects within the model and expand 
Clark’s work into this method for strategic application.  This research also considered 
only independent PMESII networks.  Independence was accepted due to the aggregated 
systems-of-systems approach.  Obviously, attempting to attack or influence one or more 
of the geographically coexisting PMESII layer nodes may have an effect on the 
untargeted nodes present, depending on the tactics chosen.  Therefore, while the systems 
may be considered to be independent, the effect of targeting a particular system may not 
be.  Future research could examine this effect-based dependence as a function of PMESII 
layer interdependence or, a time-dependent resiliency reaction from other networks in 
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response to the targeted system.  Unfortunately, unclassified data could not be found to 
differentiate these effects and account for them to increase the predictive power of this 
method in its current form.   
 Lastly, referring to Figure 3, the next step in this targeting process should involve 
a DIME assignment process for the tasking of these targets to capability.  This could 
involve an optimization or Value Focused Thinking approach to determining which mix 
of targets is ideal to forward a particular strategy set within a particular Phase of War.  
This might be coupled with an analysis of multiple objectives per PMESII layer; target 
packages could then be scored according to how many objectives the target mix satisfies.   
5.6 Conclusion 
The need for a set of strategic tools and methods is apparent from the US 
military’s use of force in the latter half of the 20th century and the 21st century to date.  As 
the advance of technology continues to provide both positive and negative effects across 
developed nations, the manner in which we develop strategies to engage with our allies as 
well as dissuade our adversaries must evolve and maintain flexibility.  When strategies 
are built through a holistic review of all PMESII layers, such a strategy provides a clearer 
vision, better coordination of effect, and a cogent intent that subordinate decision makers 
can readily understand.   
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Appendix A: PNDCG Settings for Atlantia Network 
Economic Network:  
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  20 
NUM_NODES  80 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  2 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.6 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE econdist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  0 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt 
 
Economic Degree Dist File: 
 
.3 
.2 
.4 
.1  
 
Information Network: 
 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  5 
NUM_NODES  100 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  2 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.6 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE econdist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  0 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt  
 
Information Network Degree Dist File: 
 
.1 
.1 
.5  
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Infrastructure Network: 
 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  0 
NUM_NODES  80 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  2 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.6 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE econdist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  0 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt 
 
Infrastructure Network Degree Dist File: 
 
.05 
.05 
.4 
.5 
 
Military Network: 
 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  30 
NUM_NODES  60 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  2 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.6 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE econdist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  15 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt  
 
Military Network Degree Dist File: 
 
.1 
.3 
.4 
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Political Network: 
 
IS_DIRECTED  Y 
RANDOM_SEED  50 
NUM_NODES  50 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  1 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.2 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE poldist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  20 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt  
 
Political Network Degree Dist File: 
 
.2 
.3 
.4 
.1  
 
Social Network: 
 
IS_DIRECTED  Y 
RANDOM_SEED  10 
NUM_NODES  60 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 100 
EX_FILE   ex_U_1000.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  1 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.2 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE socdist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  10 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 5 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraph.txt  
 
Social Network Degree Dist File: 
 
.3 
.2 
.4 
.1   
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Appendix B: PNDCG Settings for Exemplar Substitutions 
Social Network: 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  15 
NUM_NODES  1899 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   facebook.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  1.8 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  10 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 4 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphA.txt 
 
Economic Network:  
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  3 
NUM_NODES  1490 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   blogosphere.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.0 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  8 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 4 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphA.txt 
 
Political Network: 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  46 
NUM_NODES  306 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   elegans.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  1.8 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  5 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 4 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphA.txt 
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Infrastructure Network: 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  20 
NUM_NODES  4941 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   powergrid.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.5 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  10 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 4 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphA.txt 
 
Military Network: 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  10 
NUM_NODES  500 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   airport.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  1.7 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  0 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 3 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 9 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphb2.txt 
 
Information Network: 
IS_DIRECTED  N 
RANDOM_SEED  1 
NUM_NODES  9664 
PCT_DEVIATION_FROM_EX 0 
EX_FILE   cali.txt 
DEGREE_DIST  3 
POWER_DIST_EXP  2.1 
DEGREE_DIST_FILE dist.txt 
PCT_CLUSTERING  0 
NUM_OUTPUT_FILES 3 
OUTPUT_FILE_START_NUM 1 
OUTPUT_DATA_FILE outputgraphA.txt 
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